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stitution .... ',120 Relying on Bell v. Hood,'21 which held that the allega-
tion of damages suffered as a result of actions of federal officers in
violation of the fourth and fifth amendments stated a sufficient claim
for the district court to exercise jurisdiction, the court stated that the
lower court might have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). How-
ever, the action was dismissed with leave to amend "for failure to allege
a statutorily required amount in controversy exceeding $10,000."122
THE WAR POwER
Litigation challenging the legality of the Vietnam War has arisen
in a variety of contexts. Citizens claiming their ultimate liberty is at
stake,123 taxpayers contending their money is being spent for an un-
constitutional purpose,124 young men refusing to be inducted into an
army which they claim is fighting an unconstitutional war, 25 and
soldiers who have received orders to report for transfer to Vietnam 126
12o Id.
121 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
122 422 F.2d at 568.
123 See Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042
(1970). Plaintiff, a college professor, alleged that maintenance of the present military
conflict in Vietnam absent a congressional declaration of war jeopardized his ultimate
liberty, contributed to serious inflation, diminished funds available for social welfare, and
led to the death and wounding of innumerable Americans, including his relatives. The
court held that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate such a personal stake in the
matter as to warrant the conclusion that he had standing to sue.
124 See Kalish v. United States, 411 F.2d 606 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 US. 835
(1969); In Kalish, Plaintiff claimed that a taxing statute was motivated by the need to
raise funds for use in the Vietnam War effort. The court said that the taxpayer did not
have standing since he failed to show that Congress in enacting the Tax Adjustment Act
of 1966 had breached a specific limitation upon its taxing and spending power; In Auten-
rieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969), a class action taxpayer suit brought by
conscientious objectors to the war, the court held that the Constitution does not prohibit
Congress from levying taxes upon all persons, regardless of religion, for support of the
general government.
125 See United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
972 (1967). The defendant was convicted of willful failure to report for induction into the
armed services. The court stated:
Regardless of the proof that appellant might present to demonstrate the cor-
relation between the Selective Service Act and our nation's efforts in Vietnam, as
a matter of law the congressional power "to raise and support armies" and "to
provide and maintain a navy" is a matter quite distinct from the use which the
Executive makes of those who have been found qualified . . . . Whatever action
the President may order, or the Congress sanction, cannot impair this constitu-
tional power of the Congress.
Id. at 324.
See also Ashton v. United States, 404 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
960 (1969); United States v. Pratt, 412 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Prince,
398 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 946 (1968); United States v. Bolton, 192 F.2d
805 (2d Cir. 1951).
126 See Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970); Mora v. McNamara, 387
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967). But see Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538
(N.D. Cal. 1970).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
all have sought their day in court and invariably have been told that
they either lacked standing to sue or that a decision on the congres-
sional war power was a political question.
The judicial doctrine of standing concerns a party's relationship
to the legal issue he raises. Taxpayer suits against the war do not meet
the requirements of standing. In a recent such case, Pietsch v. President
Of United States,127 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:
As to some of the war-related measures which Pietsch would have
us enjoin, such as the draft, he asserts no interest in the matter
beyond that of a citizen-at-large and therefore lacks standing to con-
test their legality.... The only measure which Pietsch is arguably
in a position to challenge is the expenditure of funds in furtherance
of the war. Under Flast v. Cohen, however, Pietsch's attack must
assert the violation of "specific constitutional limitations imposed
upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power."
Although more than one purpose has been attributed to Congress'
war power, that power has never been seen as a "specific limitation"
upon the appropriation power. Pietsch's status as a federal tax-
payer therefore does not entitle him to challenge the expenditure
of funds for the Vietnam war.128 (citations omitted)
Suits by inductees also encounter the standing requirement since such
persons may never receive orders for Vietnam and the draft itself is
clearly authorized by Congress. 29 A young man who has already
received his deployment orders, however, may be asked to give his life
for a war he claims is not authorized by Congress. His position in rela-
tion to the war clause issue is certainly no less direct than that of a steel
company which challenges unauthorized seizure of steel mills. 30
The political question doctrine, on the other hand, concerns itself
not with the relationship of the parties to the issue, but solely with the
nature of the issue itself. The Supreme Court, in Baker v. Carr'3' said
127 434 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970).
128 Id. at 863.
129 See cases cited note 125 supra.
130 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The steel company
challenged the President's seizure of its property in his role as Commander-in-Chief. It
did not challenge the constitutionality of the Korean War itself. This suggests that the
nature of the issue in any war power challenge of the Vietnam War may involve consider-
ations of diplomacy, foreign policy and military strategy which did not exist in the
Youngstown case.
131 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961). For discussions of the political question doctrine as it
relates to the Vietnam War see Bean, The Supreme Court And The Political Question: Af-
firmation Or Abdication; W. VA. L. Rzv. 97 (1969); Hughes, Civil Disobedience And The
Political Question Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1968); Velvel, The War in Vietnam:
Unconstitutional, Justiciable, And Jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 KAN. L. REv. 449 (1968).
See also Scharpf, Judicial Review And The Political Question: A Financial Analysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
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that if any one of the following elements is inextricably involved in a
case, the political question doctrine attaches:
[a] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving li; or the impos-
sibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind dearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an un-
usual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multi-
farious pronouncements by various departments on one question.132
The focus of legal debate over the war clause in relationship to our
activities in Southeast Asia has centered on the political question doc-
trine.1 33 More specifically, should a judicial determination be made
over a subtle power relationship between the legislative and executive
branches concerning the conduct of our foreign policy and, if so, to
what extent? 34
132 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 217 (1961). In employing some of these standards in
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), the Supreme Court found no political question
difficulty when it held that Congress had exceeded its power to judge the qualifications of
of its own members. The Court stated:
Such a determination falls within the traditional role accorded courts to interpret
the law, and does not involve "a lack of the respect due a coordinate branch
of government" nor does it involve an "initial policy determination of a kind
dearly for non-judidal discretion." Our system of government requires that
federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with
the construction given that document by another branch. The alleged conflict that
such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their con-
stitutional responsibility.
Powell v. Mc Cormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969).
133 See Luftig v. Mc Namara, 373 F.2d 664, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
Circuit Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger stated emphatically that the separation of
powers "established by the Constitution precludes judges from overseeing the conduct of
foreign policy or the use and disposition of military power." 373 F.2d at 666.
But see Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Here the court denied a
motion to dismiss on the ground of a nonjusticiable political question and stated:
The Supreme Court has demonstrated its resourcefulness in finding ways and
means of eliminating or minimizing undesirable, practical consequences that
might otherwise follow major decisions charting new requirements in the field of
constitutional law. For example, in Powell v. Me Cormack, the Court ...held
that coercive, injunctive relief need not be granted when deemed inappropriate
under circumstances, indicating that a simple declaratory decree resolving the
constitutional question would be preferable. The Supreme Court has also used
the device of non-retroactivity with respect to the past and the device of reason-
able or deliberate speed with respect to the future. In any event, the Supreme
Court would not be called upon to decide what to do about the Vietnam war-
only to decide the legal question: By whose authority -the President, the Con-
gress or both, can the Vietnam war be continued (or discontinued) and how must
that authorization be expressed to comply with the plain, but very solemn and
tremendously important provisions of Article 1, section 8(11).
Id. at 554.
134 The Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari in cases challenging the
1972]
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the case of Berk
v. Laird, 35 held Berk's claim that orders to fight must be authorized by
joint legislative-executive action was justiciable. The court said that the
war-declaring power of Congress contains a "discoverable standard call-
ing for some mutual participation by Congress" and directed that Berk
be given an opportunity "to provide a method for resolving the ques-
tion of when specified joint legislative action is sufficient to authorize
various levels of military activity."'136 On a second appeal to the Second
Circuit,137 Berk argued that the constitutional provision requires an
express and explicit congressional authorization of the Vietnam hos-
tilities. 138 In support of this construction he pointed out that the origi-
constitutionality of the Vietnam War. This policy, as cited in notes 123-26 supra, has been
criticized from within and without the Court. See, e.g., Mora v. Mc Namara, 389 U.S.
934 (1967) (Douglas & Stewart, JJ., dissenting); Hughes, Civil Disobedience and The Politi-
cal Question Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1 (1968).
135 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970).
136 Id. at 305.
137 Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971).
138 Berk suggested three different categories of military action requiring different
measures of legislative-executive cooperation. The first category includes various types
of emergency action, such as repelling an attack on the United States or protecting Ameri-
can citizens from attack, which the President may take without any action by Congress.
In the second category are placed other acts of war against organized states and
aid in protecting any other nation from attack; he claims these acts may be authorized
or ratified by any explicit congressional action, but not by appropriation acts, unless
they explicitly and by their own terms authorize, sanction or direct military action. The
Vietnam War is placed in the third category, described as hostilities of the highest
magnitude as measured by numbers of men involved, amounts of equipment, and use of
the most powerful weapons. Such actions, it was asserted, cannot be initiated without prior
explicit Congressional authority. Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715, 717 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
But see 54 Dep't State Bull. 474 (1966), reprinted in Legality of United States
Participation in the Viet Nam Conflict: A Symposium, 75 YALE L.J. 1885 (1966). The
State Department argues that the actions undertaken in Viet Nam are authorized by the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Pact and the constitutional power given the president
as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. The following reasoning process is em-
ployed: At the Federal Constitutional Convention in 1787, it was originally proposed that
Congress have the power to "make war." Madison and Gerry then moved to substitute
"to declare war" for "to make war," leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden
attacks. Since the world has grown much smaller in the twentieth century, an attack on
a country far from our shores can impinge directly on the nation's security. In the SEATO
Treaty, it is formally declared that an armed attack against Viet Nam would endanger the
peace and safety of the United States. Under Article VI of the Constitution, "all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land." Under our Constitution it is the President who must
decide when an armed attack has occurred. He has the constitutional responsibility for
determining what measures of defense are required when the peace and safety of the
United States are endangered. If he considers that deployment of U.S. forces to South
Vietnam is required and that measures against the source of Communist aggression in
North Vietnam are necessary, he is constitutionally empowered to take those measures
without formally consulting the Congress.
For a critical analysis of this line of reasoning, see Note, Congress, the President, and
the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. Rv. 1771, 1783-84 (1968). Here it
.is argued that one of the prerequisites for unilateral presidential response even in defense
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nal intent of the clause was to place responsibility for the initiation of
war upon the body most responsive to popular will.139 He further
argued that without such authorization, developments committing the
nation to war as a fait accompli became the inevitable result of presi-
dential direction of foreign policy and that military appropriations and
other war-implementing enactments lack an explicit authorization of
particular hostilities.140
In its decision, the court stated that "[t]he test is whether there is
any action by the Congress sufficient to authorize or ratify the military
activity in question" and, accordingly, held that "[t]here is no lack of
clear evidence to support a conclusion that there was an abundance of
continuing mutual participation in the prosecution of the war .... 141
of the country is that the attack be so sudden that resort to Congress is militarily pre-
cluded. It is further maintained that although the President must still be left with the
power to judge whether a given event constitues an imminent threat to our survival and
demands a response which leaves no time to seek Congress' acquiescence, such limited
discretion falls far short of authorizing assumption of his defensive war-making powers
whenever the interest jeopardized is labelled a vital security interest. See also Reveley,
Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation? 55 VA. L. REv., 1245
(1969).
139For a learned discussion of this contention, see Indochina :The Constitutional
Crisis-Part One, 116 CONG. Rc. 7117 (daily ed. May 13, 1970).
140 Professor Dan Wallace, Jr., a member of the Georgetown University Law Center,
had testified at the district court hearing that rules against including substantive legis-
lation in appropriations bills are necessary in order to prevent the appropriations com-
mittee from encroaching on the powers of the substantive committees. He also pointed out
that a number of Congressmen, while opposed to the escalation of the war, voted for the
bills because they felt obliged to support the forces already there and because they
believed policy issues should not be decided through appropriations bills Berk v. Laird
317 F. Supp. 715, 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
The administration specifically stated that the May 1965 appropriation request was
not a routine request but was being made as a means of presenting the Vietnam issue.
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Message to the Congress, May 4, 1965, in SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, BACKGROUND INFOR, MATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAf,
S. Doc. No. 160-63, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967). At the same time, however, the President
made dear that the additional funds were needed to protect our men and supplies and to
provide them with modem equipment. The possibility of a dual interpretation makes it
difficult to construe such appropriations as equivalent to explicit authorization for the
war. See Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation? 55
VA. L. REV. 1243, 1250 n.2 (1969).
Once the President has committed troops to combat, he can generally rally support even
from those opposed to his policies by demanding that they back the boys in the field or
presumably face political oblivion. See also Note, Congress, The President, and the Power
to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1771, 1801 (1968). Even when there is
no Presidential fait accompli, if the power over appropriations had been thought a suf-
ficient safeguard against presidential war-making, it becomes difficult to understand why
the framers were so concerned about withholding the war power from the Executive in
the first place.
141 Berk v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971).
In response to the demands of the military operations, the executive during the
1960's ordered more and more men and material into the war zone; and con-
gressional appropriations have been commensurate with each new level of fighting.
Until 1965, defense appropriations had not earmarked funds for Vietnam. In May
of that year President Johnson asked Congress for an emergency supplemental
19721
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The framers' intent to vest the war power in Congress is in no way de-
feated by permitting an inference of authorization from legislative ac-
tion furnishing the manpower and materials of war for the protracted
military operation in Southeast Asia."'14.2
The court pointed out that the political question doctrine prevents
it from choosing between an explicit declaration of war on the one
hand and a resolution and war-implementing legislation on the other,
as a medium of expression for congressional consent. Decisions regard-
ing the form and substance of congressional enactments authorizing
hostilities are determined by highly complex considerations of di-
plomacy, foreign policy, and military strategy inappropriate to judicial
inquiry. The court pointed out that if it were to rule that
there can be nothing more than minor military operations con-
appropriation "to provide our forces [then numbering 35,000] with the best and
most modern supplies and equipment." 111 Cong. Rec. 9283 (May 4, 1965).
Congress appropriated $700 million for use "upon determination by the President
that such action is necessary in connection with military activities in Southeast
Asia." Pub. L. 89-18, 79 Stat. 109 (1965). Appropriation acts in each subsequent
year explicitly authorized expenditures for men and material sent to Vietnam.
The 1967 appropriations act, for example, declared Congress' "firm intention
to provide all necessary support for members of the Armed Forces of the United
States fighting in Vietnam" and supported "the efforts being made by the President
of the United States ... to prevent an expansion of the war in Vietnam and to
bring that conflict to an end through a negotiated settlement ... " Pub. L.
90-5, 81 Stat. 5 (1967).
Id. at 1042 n.2.
Congress also extended the Military Selective Service Act with the knowledge that
persons conscripted under the act would be sent to Vietnam.
In H. Rep. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1967), in addition to extending
the conscription mechanism, Congress continued a suspension of the permanent
ceiling on the active duty strength of the Armed Forces, fixed at 2 million
men, and replaced it with a secondary ceiling of 5 million. The House Report
recommending extension of the draft concluded that the permanent manpower
limitations "are much lower than the currently required strength." The Report
referred to President Johnson's selective service message which said, ". . . that
without the draft we cannot realistically expect to meet our present commitments
or the requirements we can now foresee and that volunteers alone could be
expected to man a force of little more than 2.0 million. The present number
of personnel on active duty is about 3.3 million and it is scheduled to reach almost
3.5 million by June, 1968 if the present conflict is not concluded by then. H.
Rep. No. 267, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 28, 41 (1967).
Id. at 1042 n.3.
142 Berk v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1052 (2d Cir. 1971). It is difficult to reconcile this
rationale of implied ratification by appropriations and the like with the rationale of the
Supreme Court in Green v. Mc Elroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959):
[Congressional] decisions cannot be assumed by acquiescence or non-action . ..
because explicit action, especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality, requires
careful and purposeful consideration by those responsible for enacting and im-
plementing our laws.
360 U.S. at 507.
It is also difficult to reconcile the rationale of an implied power of the congressional
branch to validate a Presidential war by various means other than an explicit declaration
of war under Article I, section 8(11), with the rationale of the Supreme Court in Youngs-
town, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952), to the effect that no such implication would be drawn with
respect to the power of the executive branch under article II.
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ducted under any circumstances, short of an express and explicit
declaration of war by Congress, then extended military operations
could not be conducted even though both the Congress and the
President were agreed that they were necessary and were also agreed
that a formal declaration of war would place the nation in a pos-
ture in its international relations which would be against its best
interests. 43
The test employed by the Second Circuit is a far cry from the
"prior explicit authorization" standard upon which adjudication of
the issue was sought. Once again, the political question doctrine in-
fluenced any attempt to judicially define the constitutional propriety of
the means by which Congress has chosen to ratify and approve the war
in Southeast Asia. The court was asked to formulate express rules limit-
ing the President's authority in an area in which it may be desirable to
have few rules. 144
In defining the war power requirement as some mutual participa-
tion by Congress and accepting implied ratification and approval as
satisfying that test, the court implies that the congressional role is one
of ratification rather than initiation of policy,145 even if that policy in-
143 Bark v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971).
144 See Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN.
L. RFV. 485, 512 (1924); cf. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Func-
tional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 555-56 (1966).
145 This does not mean that Congress has no role in the formation of policy. See
Indo China: The Constitutional Crisis, 116 CONG. REc. 7117 (daily ed. May 13, 1970).
The power of the purse is the last bastion of popular control of the government. Congress
now has the opportunity to use this power to restore the Constitutional balance by
including in authorization acts any of a number of restrictions on the use of American
funds and forces in Indo China. More forceful than a resolution of one or both houses,
enacting specific restrictions on the use of our military forces in Indo China and directing
their withdrawal would effectively assert congressional control of the limited war in
which we are now engaged. Proposed restrictive provisions are not only a legitimate
exercise of Congress' money power, but pose no danger of inflexibly committing our
policy to a hazardous course because (1) they include exceptions which insure the
safety of our forces, and (2) they may be overridden by future congressional action if
circumstances change.
On June 30, 1970 by a 58-37 vote, the Senate adopted the Cooper-Church Amendment,
S. Res. 609, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., -CONG. Rac. -(1970), to limit presidential action in
Cambodia. The Senate's action "represented the first time legislative restrictions on the
President's powers as Commander-in-Chief have been voted during a shooting war."
N.Y. Times, July 1, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
Congress must still face the problem of how to effectively enforce its will upon an un-
willing president. The following remarks of Senator Church highlight this dilemma:
Congress has declared it a national policy that all American troops be withdrawn
from Indochina by a date certain, once the release of American prisoners of war
is assured.
President Nixon has chosen to disregard the Mansfield Amendment, by
saying it is without binding force and effect....
If it is the President's intention to set aside, in this offhand way, the Mansfield
Amendment, passed by both Houses of Congress, the Congress should now enact
enforcement legislation, utilizing the power of the purse, a power which belongs
1972]
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volves military activity of the highest magnitude in terms of the num-
ber of troops involved.
Perhaps the court was heavily influenced by the expansion of the
presidential role of Commander-in Chief during the twentieth century;
the executive has regularly used military force abroad in situations
such as Korea, the Formosan Strait, Lebanon, and the Dominican
Republic without relying on express authorization and without consti-
tutional challenge.1 46 Various situations arise requiring different de-
grees of military response, and the executive department, with its vast
intelligence network and diplomatic core, is in the best position to
make an initial policy judgment and respond accordingly. 47 In a world
exclusively to Congress; and it should enact it in such a way as to enforce the
provisions of the Mansfield amendment.
117 CONG. RFc. 18, 874 (daily ed., Nov. 1971).
A group of citizens has indicated that they will move in the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of New York, for an injunction directing Mr. Nixon to set a
final date for withdrawal of our troops, contingent upon release of American prisoners in
accordance with the Mansfield Amendment. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1971, § 5, at 5, col. 2
(advertisement).
For an analysis of the judicial role in the Indochina controversy, see Ratner,
Coordinated War-Making Power-Legislative, Executive and Judicial Roles, 44 So. CAF.
L. REv. 461, 480-89 (1971).
146 See Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U.L. Rv. 19 (1970).
Most writers who seek constitutionally based restrictions on the President's war-
making power argue that the precedents are not compelling. Indeed, it has been
suggested that there is only one prior illustration of Presidential commitment
of armed forces to war without congressional authorization, namely, Korea ...
Taken as a whole [the precedents] seem to me to add up to the following. With
ever-increasing frequency, presidents have employed that amount of force that
they deemed necessary to accomplish their foreign policy objectives. When little
force was needed . . . little was used; when larger committments were necessary,
they too were forthcoming. Whatever the intention of the framers, the military
machine has become simply an instrument for the achievement of foreign
policy goals, which, in turn, have become a central responsibility of the
presidency. Congress has seldom objected on legal grounds, and so the only limita-
tion upon presidential power has been that imposed by political considerations.
That is the teaching of our history.
Id. at 26-27. Cf. Legal Memorandum on the Amendments to End The War, 116 CoNG. REC.
7476 (daily ed. May 19, 1970).
On the weight to be given non-legal precedents, see Youngstown Sheet And Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The Constitution is a framework for government. Therefore the way the frame-
work is consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated according
to its true nature. Deeply imbedded traditional ways of conducting government
cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the
words of the text or supply them.
343 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added).
147 The "incursion" into Cambodia is one such example. After repeal of the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution, 116 CONG. REc. 9670 (daily ed. June 24, 1970) the War in Indo-
China rests legally on the President's constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief to pro-
tect the lives of American troops. It is asserted that this type of executive decision can
be made without any form of congressional authorization. See Remarks of Assistant
Attorney General William H. Rehnquist before the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York, The President's Constitutional Authority to Order the Attack on the Cambodian
Sanctuaries, May 28, 1970. Cf. Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit
Forces to Combat, 81 HAav. L Ray. 1771, 1796-98 (1968).
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where a political situation often demands rapid changes in policy and
even in a situation of gradual escalation, it would unduly hamper the
conduct a foreign policy if a court set up a hard-and-fast rule requiring
explicit congressional authorization whenever a change in policy is
made in a situation deemed to be a "war."'148
Significantly, the court did not rely solely on the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution as providing the requisite constitutional authorization,
even though both parties debated whether it authorized the war.1 49 If
the court had relied on that resolution as fulfilling the constitutional
requirement, its decision might have been interpreted as demanding
express and explicit authorization of "war" by Congress. The court
realized that such a judgment might be a political question15 0
148 If Article I, section 8 is interpreted to mean that there shall be no war- declared
or otherwise -unless Congress takes the initiative, the problem of defining war and
initiation of war must be faced. From the beginning it has been recognized that not
every involvement of the armed forces can be a "war" requiring congressional action.
In the modem context where international conflict has so many ,forms, the problem
is even more difficult. See Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces
to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1771, 1774 (1968).
149 Berk could have argued that those who voted for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
did not envision a widening of the war and, therefore, it did not constitute prior explicit
authorization of future action such as the bombing of North Vietnam. Such a theory must
rely on the subjective intent of certain supporters of that resolution for the resolution
itself is stated in terms of a broad grant of authority:
The United States is therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take
all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance
in defense of its freedom.
Act of August 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384.
Even the legislative history of the Tonkin Resoultion supports the view that Congress
was aware that it was extending sweeping authority to the President. When questioned
by Senator Cooper as to whether the resolution gave the President advance authority to
take whatever action he deemed necessary for the defense of Vietnam, Senator Fulbright
responded affirmatively, 110 CONG. Rac. 18,409 (1964).
Curiously, Senator Morse considered the Resoluttion a predated declaration of war and
felt that it was an unconstitutional delegation of power. 111 CONG. REc. 9501 (1964). Cf.
United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304, 324 (1936). This case has been
interpreted as withdrawing "virtually all constitutional limitation upon the scope of
congressional delegation of power to the President to act in the area of international
relations." Jones, The President, Congress and Foreign Relations, 29 CALIF. L. RFV. 565,
575 (1941). See also Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to
Combat, 81 HARv. L. Rzv. 1771, 1803 (1968).
A resolution does confer authority potentially to embark on war, and therefore, the
scope of authority should be dearly and unambiguously expressed. Where problems of
predicability seem insurmountable, limited authority should be granted by providing
for expiration and renewal after a specified time and by confining the authorization to
specific areas and specific purposes.
For the view that the resolution should not be interpreted as authorizing the
executive to wage an Asian war, see Velvel, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional,
Justiciable, and Jurisdictionally Attachable, 16 KAN. L. REv. 449, 473-79 (1968); Mottola
v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538, 544 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("[T]he intent of Congress . . . was merely
to support the President during a reported emergency in his announced determination
to repel any attack upon American ships or personnel in Vietnam.')
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